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_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
Technological innovation has led to the prevalent use of algorithms in everyday decision 
making.  So ubiquitous is the application of algorithms that many may not recognize its impact 
on their daily lives.  From online shopping to applying for a home loan, algorithms are at play in 
categorizing and filtering individuals to serve the goal of providing more accurate and efficient 
results than human decisionmaking would.  At the basic level, algorithms are nothing more than 
a series of step-by-step instructions compiled by a computer, which then analyzes swaths of 
data based on those instructions.1  However, when algorithms use incorrect variables to filter 
results - such as certain stereotypes about minorities - or, more imperceptibly, learn bad habits 
from how humans behave online, our absolute reliance on their results can cause disparate harm 
to minority communities.2 
The pervasive use of algorithms by both corporate and government organizations for the 
purposes of efficiency and pattern analysis in the collection of Big Data has brought questions 
to light as to (1) whether these algorithms are fair across the board and (2) whether they 
contribute to disparate outcomes resulting in discriminatory practices. The inquiry then 
                                               
1 Luke Dormehl, The Formula: How Algorithms Solve All Our Problems...and Create More (Perigee, 2014). 
2 Id. at 150. 
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ultimately turns to the legal methods to regulate algorithms in order to combat their negative 
influence while still maintaining all the technological success and convenience society enjoys. 
Defining Algorithms 
I. What Are Algorithms? 
“Algorithm” is a generic term that, at the most basic level,  simply means “a sequence of 
instructions telling a computer what to do.”3 It is created from a string of computer codes that  
analyzes, filters, and select information from large data sets about individuals and trends.  
Algorithms can also track behavior over time and reverse engineer data to determine the 
individual characteristics that make up a particular result.  For example, banks use algorithms to 
detect money laundering by tracking every transaction the bank makes on a daily basis to find 
suspicious activity at the root of the money laundering.4 An algorithm is also the formula that 
search engines like Google use to show tailored results for our searches or suggestions of 
products that Amazon predicts and individual will purchase based on previous search history 
product purchases.  Algorithms are also responsible for recommending the television programs 
one watches, books they read, and people they date.  While these seem like benefits to 
maximize our preferences, algorithms can also be used to determine whether an individual is 
likely to be a hardworking employee, commit a crime, or be a bad driver.5  
The advantage of algorithms is that they are useful to navigate large amounts of data 
(analyzing about 2.5 quintillion bytes of data that are generated each day)6 that humans are 
incapable of synthesizing, and subsequently draw conclusions and identify patterns from all the 
data.  They are also cost and time-efficient while drawing objective, logical conclusions of the 
                                               
3 Pedro Domingos, The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate Learning Machine Will Remake our 
World, 1 (Basic Books 2015). 
4 Dormehl, supra note 1. 
5 Id. at 18. 
6 Id. at 2. 
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chaotic social order humans have created.  However, society has begun to recognize the dangers 
brought by the tailored efficiency of algorithms.  By sifting through an individual’s preferences 
and providing the best search results to suit the preference, a filter bubble emerges in which 
individuals are unable to see opposing or alternative viewpoints or products in social media or 
online shopping activities.  For example, Google searches will provide very different results to 
individuals who the algorithm deems to be a liberal from online activity than to individuals who 
are deemed to be conservatives.  Results may also differ between those the algorithm deems to 
be male and those deemed female, again by tracking the individual's’ online behavior over 
time.7  And while some may say this is, again, benign and positive preference individualization, 
consider the dangers when such differences are used by the government to determine criminal 
threats.  Police departments across the country have used algorithms to detect whether a 
particular neighborhood in the city is more likely to attract crime based on past police activity, 
as well as what types of individuals are more likely to reoffend based on one’s age, childhood 
factors, and resident zip code.8 
The danger of such reliance on algorithms is that, despite the benefits and assumption 
that algorithms are efficient, logical, and data-driven and therefore unbiased, algorithms are not 
infallible and oftentimes carry biases of their own or of their creators.9  Algorithms are not only 
sometimes wrong in predicting shopping preferences, but even more dangerous, are noted to 
turn out false positives and false negatives in forecasting individuals likely to commit a crime.10  
Such mistakes based on incorrect assumptions or stereotypes about an individual’s 
characteristics (age, race, gender, zip code, etc.) results in unfortunate consequences for those of 
                                               
7 Id. at 47. 
8 Id. at 110-113. 
9 Id. at 232. 
10 Id. at 123.  Predictive tools on criminal activity are only accurate 75% of the time. 
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differing socioeconomic and racial backgrounds when used in policymaking, police strategies, 
or employment hiring practices. 
II. How Do Algorithms Work? 
Big data is the term given to the large amounts of data gathered by companies about 
individuals through the use of devices, computers, and the internet.11 Big data is necessary for 
algorithms to function and crunch numbers. In order for algorithms to work initially, there needs 
to be a starting set of data to be analyzed.12 The more data the better for learning algorithms 
because it allows the algorithms to find patterns or answer questions posed to it by combing 
through enormous amounts of data.13 Learning algorithms are generally various types of sub-
algorithms that take in differing types of data and produce different answers based on what 
information was fed into the algorithm.14 Every sub-algorithm that produces a desired result, 
such as an individual clicking on a certain ad or website, increases the amount of times the sub-
algorithm is used to make that decision. Algorithms and data sets, at their core, are just 
numbers.  
Furthermore, the data that is entered into the algorithm has the ability to affect the 
outcome based on the parameters set by the algorithm creator. At its very core an algorithm is a 
model, a tool, to simplify and make combing through data more efficient. Unfortunately in the 
process of creation the model (algorithm) is oversimplified and the creators “make choices 
about what’s important enough to include, simplifying the world into a toy version that can be 
                                               
11 Federal Trade Commission, Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion? (January 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-
issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf.  
12 Domingos, supra note 3. 
13 Id. at 9. 
14 Id.  
5 
easily understood and from which we can infer important facts and actions.”15 From this desire 
to over simplify, often factors that should or should not be included in the data collection 
process are added to the mix resulting in discriminatory outcomes for individuals in different 
sectors.  
Identification of Problems with Algorithm Use 
Although an algorithm may not be discriminatory in nature, the use of the algorithm’s 
results can lead to disparate effects. The collection of more data about individuals as they use 
the internet leads to possible new methods of discrimination. Companies and data brokers that 
collect data about individuals as they surf the web and use products from different vendors 
collect and aggregate all the data about individuals in order to create a profile. The problems 
associated with such aggregation of data is beyond the scope of this paper, but the use of the 
profile is important to consider when looking at how discrimination happens at the hands of 
algorithms.  
Two common discriminatory issues arise with the reliance on seemingly benign 
algorithms. First, the input of data that allows algorithms to identify these trends is biased to 
begin with, and then ultimately wielded by humans, results in discriminatory ends. Second, and 
the more difficult problem to identify, is learner algorithms who learn from bad habits of 
humans.  Both theses types of algorithm use reinforce pre-existing discrimination or biases that 
humans suffer from even without the use of technology.   
I. Discriminatory Input 
 The use of algorithms has become commonplace as technology advances because it 
removes much of the pressure of decision-making off human beings.  This is not only 
                                               
15 Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy, 20 
(Crown 2016). 
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convenient, but it is intended to remove bias inherent in human decision-making. “The 
attraction of  [an algorithm] isn’t hard to understand. It promoted ‘automation bias,’ an 
assumption that a machine-driven, software-enabled system is going to offer better results than 
human    judgment.”16 Unfortunately, the data entered into the neutral algorithm is flawed from 
the beginning. Typically, the initial data entered into the system is based off previous year's 
record keeping and data or factors that a particular algorithm creator deems important to 
consider (race, gender, age, weight, etc.). Depending on the sector that data has inherent biases 
of countless reviewers which is all fed into the algorithm. “[T]he reality is that humans craft 
those algorithms and can embed in them all sorts of biases and perspectives.”17 Therefore, the 
danger with this type of algorithm is that even with the most “neutral” analysis of data trends 
aggregated over time, humans are still capable of using the results to draw discriminatory 
conclusions and create disparate results. 
II. Machine Learning Algorithms 
 Machine-learning algorithms adapt to new information it acquires and fine-tunes its 
targeting and analysis based on evolving input. For example, in advertisement targeting, the 
learning mechanism of algorithms have identified a click-through trend from some women on 
certain websites or social media sites clicking on advertisements for lower wage employment 
opportunities and therefore maximized on this "success" rate by increasing the amount of such 
advertisements seen by women on social media pages, user profile pages, and websites geared 
toward women.18 Unfortunately, this ultimately creates a self-perpetuating bias as women are 
                                               
16 Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information, 107 
(Harvard University Press, 2015). 
17 Dormehl, supra note 1, at 150. 
18 Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz, and Anupam Datta, Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale 
of Opacity, Choice, and Discrimination, 1 Pʀᴏᴄᴇᴇᴅɪɴɢs ᴏɴ Pʀɪᴠᴀᴄʏ Eɴʜᴀɴᴄɪɴɢ Tᴇᴄʜɴᴏʟᴏɢɪᴇs 92, 92-112 (2015). 
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potentially less exposed to other employment options with higher wages on social media 
platforms.  
In learning how to perfect results, algorithms can perpetuate their own bias and create 
the bias. Machine learning algorithms are consider a black box 
a term used by cybernetician whenever a piece of machinery or else a set of 
commands is too complex. In its place, the black box stands in as an opaque 
substitute for technology in which nothing needs to be known other than inputs 
and outputs. Once, opened, it makes both creators and the users confront the 
subjective biases and processes that have resulted in a certain answer.19 
This closed, black box system, presents the need for transparency, for both consumers and those 
that use the algorithm. Unless a creator of an algorithm can say without a doubt that the 
algorithm is only using appropriate data in determining its answers auditors should be able to 
examine the code. Machine-learning algorithms present a challenge that need to be met with 
accountability.  
State of the Law: Examining Algorithms 
I. Barriers to Examining Algorithms 
A. Trade Secret Laws 
A large problem is the fact that most algorithms and the way they work are ensconced in 
a black-box where the coding and technical details of how algorithms track and collect data is 
mainly unknown to anyone other than the computer designers who create the algorithms.20 To 
make things more complicated, the machine learning and adaptive quality of the complex 
algorithms used today that constantly change to provide more tailored results evolve to a point 
                                               
19 Dormehl, supra note 1, at 235. 
20 O’Neil, supra note 15, at 29. 
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where its computer engineer creators may not even recognize or have the ability to control.21  
Unfortunately, with today's technology competition of search engines and web platforms 
attempting to provide the most accurate results for customers, the likelihood of divulging such 
information to the public would violate companies' trade secrets self interest. The problem with 
the inaccessibility of black box trade secrets with algorithms is the reliance on data conclusions 
that human decisionmakers do not understand.  
While most trade secret law is statutory varying from state to state, federal and 
international regulations like the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) provide commonalities in 
trade secret law.  The general goals of trade secret laws are to protect commercially valuable 
proprietary information that gives competitive advantage, including business strategies, 
management, design concepts, manufacturing techniques, and formulas.  According to the 
Congressional Research Services (CRS) Report: 
Whether information qualifies as a “trade secret” under federal or state 
law is a question of fact that may be determined by a jury. A jury may 
consider several factors in assessing whether certain material is a trade 
secret, including the following:  the extent to which the information is 
known outside of the company;  the extent to which it is known by 
employees and others involved in the company;  the extent of measures 
taken by the company to guard the secrecy of the information;  the value 
of the information to the company and to its competitors;  the amount of 
effort or money expended by the company in developing the 
                                               
21 Dormehl, supra note 1, at 236. 
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information; and  the ease or difficulty with which the information could 
be properly acquired or duplicated by others.22 
Companies will continue to be protected by trade secret law, as unlike patents or copyrights, 
trade secrets never expire and therefore do not ever have to be revealed or released to the 
public.23 
 At the state level, Washington’s trade secret law is codified in RCW 19.108.010 which 
defines trade secret to mean information including a formula or method that:  
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means 
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or 
use; and (b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.24 
The only ways in which trade secret protection can be lost are if there is even a single 
unprotected disclosure to the public of the trade secret (either by photograph, technical, paper, 
or any other form of disclosure); the product is legally reverse engineered to discover the trade 
secret;  or if a competitor independently develops around it.25  The crux of trade secret 
protections revolve around reasonable measures that a company has taken to maintain secrecy.26 
Algorithms used to enhance search engine results or provide predictions on rates of 
recidivism of criminally convicted individuals are certainly information that has substantial 
economic value, engendering fierce competition, incentivizing its secrecy.  An oft-referred to 
                                               
22 Congressional Research Services, 7-5700, R43714, Protection of Trade Secrets: Overview of Current Law and 
Legislation, 2 (Apr. 22, 2016).  
23 Pasquale, supra note 16, at 83. 
24 RCW 19.108.010 
25 Office of Policy and External Affairs, Trade Secrets Protection in the U.S., Uɴɪᴛᴇᴅ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇꜱ  Pᴀᴛᴇɴᴛ ᴀɴᴅ 
Tʀᴀᴅɪᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Tʀᴀᴅᴇᴍᴀʀᴋ Offɪᴄᴇ (2012), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/mep/marinaslides.pdf 
26 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mortensen, 606 F.3d 22 (2010) (holding that no reasonable measures taken when 
client lists were left with Nationwide agents without further protections). 
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example is Google’s use of multiple algorithms that optimize search results for users, known in 
the industry as RankBrain and Page Rank, which has deep machine learning components that 
are not only complex but heavily guarded in secrecy.27  Google and other commercial service 
providers maintain strict rules to prevent competitors from analyzing and reverse engineering 
their algorithms, protected by trade secret and patent law.28 Thus, whether at a federal or state 
level, the formula that computer engineers use to create such systems are difficult, if not 
impossible, to obtain in order to challenge or analyze even if a lawmaker, attorney, or judge was 
adept at computer engineering.  Further, the incentive to maintain the innovative nature of 
technology via the use of algorithms counsels against blanket legislation directed at undoing or 
diminishing the role of trade secret laws.29 
B. Deep Learning: Questions That Simply Cannot Be Answered by Data Scientists. 
The goal for learner algorithms is to theoretically become self sufficient. Data scientists 
strive to create the “Master Algorithm,” one in which the algorithm self corrects and correlates 
data without feedback from the data scientists.30 As algorithms continue to process data and 
create parameters based on patterns apparent in the data the outcomes may move away from the 
original intention but still fall within the goal of the program. This creates several problems as 
some algorithms have advanced to the point that the creators are no longer sure as to how the 
algorithm comes to its final answer. If the data scientists and algorithm creators are no longer 
able to identify the process which the algorithm used to determine its answer, how is anyone 
able to identify the path the algorithm took? The profiles created by data brokers are put into an 
algorithm and an answer is given depending on the sector: whether it’s this individual is going 
                                               
27 Danny Sullivan, Sneak Peak into Black Box of Google’s Search Algorithm, Sᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Eɴɢɪɴᴇ Lᴀɴᴅ (June 23, 2016, 
1:01 PM), http://searchengineland.com/faq-all-about-the-new-google-rankbrain-algorithm-234440.  
28 Darren Stevenson, Locating Discrimination in Data Based Systems, Oᴘᴇɴ Tᴇᴄʜɴᴏʟᴏɢʏ Iɴsᴛɪᴛᴜᴛᴇ, 16-19 (2014) 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2014/10/00078-92938.pdf 
29 Id. 
30 Domingos, supra note 3, at 25. 
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to be a great employee to this individual has a high potential recidivism rate. Leaner algorithms 
inhibits the transparency needed to ensure only appropriate categories of data are used (not race, 
sex, ethnic background, etc.) to make determinations.  
II. Laws Which Enable the Examination of Algorithms 
The unregulated nature of algorithms has begun to change as society begins to recognize 
the dangers of leaving algorithms primarily in charge of human decisionmaking.  A good sign 
is the European Union (EU), for example, which has incorporated a new routine regarding the 
use of machine learning algorithms.  The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
effective in May 2018, will legally provide a “right to explanation” for users to challenge the 
ways in which algorithms are used especially in decisions made about them.31  Additionally, 
Article 22 (“Automated individual decision-making, including profiling”) lists prohibitions 
against the use of algorithms in systems like credit and insurance risk assessments and other 
programs which may use machine learning techniques.32  While the effects of the new law 
cannot be fully understood before 2018, the outlook is positive in understanding the need to 
regulate and understand the tools that underlie so much of human decisionmaking. 
Other methods have also emerged to combat the issues raised by the secretive and 
complicated nature of algorithms perpetuating discrimination.  Among them are methods like 
(1) algorithmic auditing, in which test variables are placed into search engines or systems run 
by algorithms to find discrepancies due to racial barriers; (2) using consumer protection laws 
like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to provide for equal opportunity protections affected 
by algorithmic tailoring in a commercial setting; (3) antitrust laws in lieu of overcoming trade 
secret laws to perhaps regulate the use and creation of algorithms in ways that may engender 
                                               
31 Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on Algorithmic Decision-Making and a “Right 
to Explanation”, Oxꜰ ᴏʀᴅ Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴇᴛ Iɴꜱ ᴛɪᴛᴜᴛᴇ (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.08813v3.pdf. 
32 Id. at 2. 
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open competition of search optimization corporations, for example; and (4) constitutional law 
claims against government agencies from using algorithms that result in disparate effects based 
on complex, unverified, and biased data assumptions. 
A. Algorithmic Auditing  
 In order to protect consumers and individuals freely giving information online for 
services there needs to be an auditing mechanism which allows independent third parties to 
evaluate the algorithms in use to search for and determine whether biases are present in the 
system. In order for this to be plausible, “data brokers need to fess up about the data they are 
hoarding, trading and selling.”33 Similar to the laws being established in the E.U., governments 
in the U.S. need to create policies to keep internet companies accountable.  
B. Consumer Protection Laws 
 Many Federal regulations have already been implemented in the field of consumer 
protection in different sectors by Federal Agencies. These laws could possibly be applied to the 
realm of algorithms and collection of data in order to protect consumers from the potentially 
discriminatory outcomes. Data brokers create profiles of individuals by accumulating data from 
several different companies. These profiles are created unknowingly by monitoring everyday 
online interactions. Acts likes the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; The FTC Act; Fair Credit 
Reporting Act; and Equal Employment Opportunity Act were all created to protect consumers 
and individuals from bigger (more sophisticated) parties.  
  i. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act34 
The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) mission is to protect consumers by preventing 
business practices that are unfair or deceptive.35 The FTC has taken upon itself the role of 
                                               
33 Pasquale, supra note 16, at 145. 
34 18 U.S.C. § 1030 
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enforcer under its Section 5 powers to ensure online business is conducted fairly.36 In regards to 
the use of big data and algorithms the FTC has published a report seeking the creation of fair 
guidelines to ensure the privacy of individuals and best business practice.37  FTC Chair Edith 
Ramirez stated we must “ensure that by using big data algorithms [firms] are not accidentally 
classifying people based on categories that society has decided- by law or ethics - not to use, 
such as race, ethnic background, gender, and sexual orientation.”38  
The Computer Fraud and Abuse act provides punishment for individuals that have had 
accessed and violated another’s privacy by obtaining information through the individual's 
computer without permission or caused that individual harm by using that information with 
intent to defraud.39 If the act were to be applicable corporations, the entities would most likely 
be found to have violated the act by using individuals information to determine a “proxy credit 
score.” The information often used to create “proxy credit” scores, is information that an 
individual might have given to a website for another purpose. The information was not intended 
to be used for the purposes of determining a credit score and therefore, the information was 
obtained without the consent of the individual.  
ii. Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)40 
The purpose of the FCRA requires credit reporting agencies to “ adopt reasonable 
procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and 
other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the 
                                                                                                                                                      
35 Federal Trade Commission, About the FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc.  
36 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
37 FTC, Big Data, supra, note 11.  
38 Pasquale, supra note 16, at 40 (citing Edith Ramirez, “Privacy Challenges in the Era of Big Data: The View from 
the Lifeguard’s Chair,” Keynote Address at the Technology Policy Institute Aspen Forum (Aug. 19, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-challenges-big-data-view-
lifeguard%E2%80%99s-chair/130819bigdataaspen.pdf ). 
39 18 U.S.C § 1030. 
40 15 U.S.C. § 1681. 
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confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information.”41 The law 
outlaws the use of certain information about individuals to used in determining credit 
worthiness, which relates to an individual’s credit score (e.g. the neighborhood in which one 
lives (redlining), race, color, religion, national origin, sex, etc.)42.  The act should theoretically 
limit the usage of data obtained online to prevent the use of information that goes into a credit 
score, however, the act is specifically tailored to apply only to “credit reporting agencies.” The 
FTC has called for data brokers to be included in the scope of the act,.43 “Credit Reporting 
Agencies,” are defined in FCRA to means any individual for money, or fees, that “engages in 
whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or 
other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third 
parties.”44 Applying this definition to Data Brokers, Data Brokers sell information about 
individuals to third parties in order for the third parties to develop “proxy credit scores” based 
on the information that has been received. Therefore, as the FTC claims, Data Brokers should 
be considered “Credit Reporting Agencies” under FCRA. 
C. Antitrust Laws 
 As data collection and the internet have become dominated by relatively few companies, 
especially in the realm of search engines, there have been many claims against large internet 
companies in regard to antitrust violations, specifically Section 2 of the Sherman Act.45 These 
antitrust claims are not only popping up in the United States but in the European Union as 
well.46 In relation to Google specifically, Joshua Hazan, has found that the company’s method 
                                               
41 15 U.S.C § 1681(b). 
42 Federal Trade Commission, Your Equal Credit Opportunity Rights, Consumer Information, (Jan. 2013), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0347-your-equal-credit-opportunity-rights. 
43 FTC, Big Data, supra, note 11.  
44 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). 
45 Pasquale, supra note 16, at 162. 
46 Id. at 163. 
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of sorting search results favors its own subsidiaries or related companies over third parties.47 
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act makes it unlawful for any person to "monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize 
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”48 In order 
to meet this standard a company must (1) have “dangerously” close to or has already achieved a 
monopoly power and (2) participate in anticompetitive conduct.49  
 The Federal Trade Commission has attempted to bring action against Google under the 
Sherman Act to challenge its use of search ranking algorithms to benefit its own products over 
that of their competitors.  The FTC claim against Google regarded the algorithms hindering 
competitive behavior by manipulating its search options for consumers.  However, the success 
has been limited, and the FTC concluded its investigation without major changes to Google’s 
search ranking practices.50  However, the European Commission has brought a more anti-
competitive action against Google under the same claims of inherent algorithmic unfairness it is 
search ranking results relating to comparison shopping services which were preferred in Google 
search results over Google’s competitors.  Google’s search engine dominates 90% of the 
European market share and therefore its influence on the market in the EU may make the 
European Commission’s claim stronger than the FTC’s investigation under the Sherman Act.51 
i. The Fourth Amendment 
                                               
47 Joshua Hazan, Stop Being Evil: A Proposal for Unbiased Google Search, 111 Michigan L. Rev. 789, 798 (2013).  
48 15 U.S.C § 2 
49 Hazan, supra note 47, at 799. 
50 Eric Savitz, Google and the FTC’s Investigation: A Cautionary Tale, Fᴏʀʙᴇs, (Nov. 4, 2012, 07:48 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/11/04/google-and-the-ftcs-investigation-a-cautionary-
tale/#263a228f3434 
51James F. Peltz and Tiffany Hsu, Google Faces Long Battle in EU Antitrust Case, Lᴏꜱ  Aɴɢᴇʟᴇꜱ  Tɪᴍᴇꜱ  (Apr. 17, 
2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-eu-google-strategy-20150417-story.html 
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 The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is meant to protect the right of “people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,”52 this right has been extended to 
protect that which people assume or reasonably suspect to be private in terms of information 
that is posted given free online.53  
Case Study 
I. Use of Algorithms in Hiring and Firing Practices 
 A case study in the use of algorithms to decide hiring and firing practices is instructive 
because the consequences of its use is not straightforwardly positive or negative.  In criminal 
sentencing, predictive policing, lending and credit score ratings, and insurance coverage, the 
results of using algorithms have been clearly negative on a wide scale and often a clear proxy 
for race.  However, the results of using algorithms in hiring and firing practices is not absolute.  
There is still space for change especially when the disparate impact is usually not a result of 
malicious intent in the creation of the algorithm.  As long as blind reliance is avoided and 
transparency in the algorithm used is ensured, algorithms may be successful in the human 
resources world. 
The use of algorithms in predictive policing contexts has been evidenced to result in 
negative and discriminatory consequences, as well as the use of algorithms in credit scoring 
coding particular individuals as high risk or lazy simply because of their name or their zip 
code.54 However, it is undeniable that using algorithms to analyze numerous resumes filed by 
over-optimistic candidates is a positive and efficient use of the tool.  Further, directing 
algorithms to look for whether candidates meet a specific education requirement, for example, is 
not necessarily illegal while other hiring benchmarks like proxy intelligence tests are.  
                                               
52 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV, §3. 
53 Katz v. United States, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967). 
54 Pasquale, supra note 16, at 38 
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However, one cannot ignore the disparate impact that the use of algorithms have on minority 
groups in many areas of the work force.  Furthermore, the secrecy and complexity of algorithms 
in making these determinations are dangerously ensconced in a black box that no one, not even 
employers carrying out the hiring and firing decisions based on these algorithms, can explain 
the reasons behind the choice.  Therefore, while there are many arguments for the positive effect 
and use of algorithms in hiring practices, it is still important to be cognizant of ways that these 
tools can mask discrimination. 
A. Defining the Problem 
An example of algorithms used in the field of human resources is told by Cathy O’Neil 
in her book, Weapons of Math Destruction.55 Ms. O’Neil identifies Sarah Wysocki, a fifth grade 
teacher who had routinely received positive scores on her yearly performance reviews, yet was 
abruptly given abysmal scores the year an algorithm was used to evaluate teachers rather than 
human based performance reviews.  Ms. Wysocki was later terminated because of district-wide 
policy to cut low performing teachers.  Ms. O’Neil and Ms. Wysocki both argue that algorithms 
ignore the wide range of soft factors that go into human resources and evaluations of 
performance like teaching, which is not inherently data-driven.56  Student to teacher 
relationship, self-esteem, and parent comfort levels with the teacher are all factors incapable of 
being evaluated by algorithms.   
Another problem with algorithms that Ms. Wysocki’s story reveals is the dangerous lack 
of transparency inherent in how algorithms arrive at their conclusion about job performance.  
Even if advocates of algorithms argue that these tools remove human error and bias which 
might have given Wysocki soft and positive evaluations in the past, there is no denying that 
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school administrators relying on these algorithms do not understand how the algorithm found 
Wysocki inadequate.  When Ms. Wysocki sought explanations as to why she received such a 
low score, how she could improve, and what she could work on, her school principal and the 
district simply did not know.57  They had blindly trusted a private company program that had 
promised efficient and accurate identification of problem teachers, without “peeking under the 
hood” of the algorithm to know what it was that the tool was actually evaluating.  Even if they 
had been given full access to the code and data used by computer engineers, the likelihood that 
a school administrator could understand its significance is low. 
This lack of transparency is frustrating for someone in Ms. Wysocki’s position, as well 
as many other teachers who are faced with technology-based evaluations and performance 
reviews based on standardized test results of their students.  However, it is even more insidious 
and dangerous when discriminatory impact results for the use of these algorithms, with no one 
to explain why or how this discrimination is occurring.  When companies and government 
agencies begin to use algorithms for hiring and firing purposes, and see decreased minority 
representation in their workforce, for example, without transparency behind what is really going 
on in the algorithm, such blind reliance on these technology tools can have harmful social 
effects. 
When talking about the use of algorithms to replace humans in the recruitment and 
retention of employees decisionmaking process, there are diametrically opposing viewpoints - 
some believe that this is the only neutral way in ensuring diversity and equality in the working 
field,58 while others think that algorithms serve as a mask for inherent discrimination59.  The 
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truth is somewhere in between: while humans are notorious for implicit bias, a total reliance on 
algorithms can continue the trends that humans have already perpetuated.  For example, in the 
context of employment, the hiring of employees can be greatly streamlined if an employer 
receives thousands of resumes a day for any given position, an algorithm that codes for specific 
requirements can eliminate non-starter candidates and save the employer time and money from 
sifting through piles of applications by hand.  However, if algorithms are written to look for 
terms in the resume which end up being a proxy for race or gender.  Especially when great 
weight is given to the reputation of a university, the systemic inequities that may have prevented 
an otherwise well-qualified applicant from enrolling in a prestigious institute of higher learning 
would then be perpetuated in the work field, further causing wealth and social disparities.  
Further, algorithms that look for certain terms or specific education requirements may ignore 
“soft” factors which could perpetuate systemic discrepancies in education and social economics, 
leading to an even widened minority gap.   
Even more involved than sifting through large piles of resumes for keywords, some 
algorithms mine for data about a particular candidate to find attributes about a person that 
would suggest a good employee (punctuality, charisma, detail-oriented translating to being a 
good salesperson, longer tenure, or high production value).60  Data-mining is a complicated 
practice, but in the employment context, it includes algorithms combing through the internet’s 
vast networking and informational system about a candidate and aggregate information to form 
conclusions given trends or patterns in every piece of information about them available - from 
                                                                                                                                                      
59 Gideon Mann and Cathy O’Neil, Hiring Algorithms Are Not Neutral, Hᴀʀᴠᴀʀᴅ Bᴜsɪɴᴇss Rᴇᴠɪᴇᴡ (Dec. 9, 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/12/hiring-algorithms-are-not-neutral; Patrick Marshall, Algorithms Can Mask Bias, SAGE 
BUSINESS RESEARCHER (February 15, 2016), http://businessresearcher.sagepub.com/sbr-1775-98200-
2717795/20160215/algorithms-can-mask-biases-in-hiring. 
60 Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 679 (2016). 
20 
zip code to social media behavior.61  This way, data-mining algorithms get a more holistic 
image of what a candidate is truly like and therefore arrive at more “accurate” predictions about 
their likelihood of success at a given position.  However, because data on racial and gender 
minorities already reflect a trend in inequalities that result in lower employment rates, higher 
conviction rates, more time off from work to care for family, etc., the algorithms blinding 
churning through this data will only learn from this system of inequalities and make predictions 
about minority candidates based on patterns in the minority group. 62 Therefore, minority 
candidates will still be labeled by algorithms as less favorable for employment because of 
existing societal bias.  Algorithms do not solve the problem of bias, but further hides the 
problem under a veil of neutrality. 
Finally, another issue presented with algorithmic hiring that emphasizes data mining and 
pattern recognition is the populations on the fringes of technology who are left out of the 
employment process if they do not have access to technology.  For example, if geographically 
or economically, a certain group of individuals are less likely to engage in technology like 
social media or reference the correct coded terms in their job applications and resumes for 
algorithms to identify, their lack of technological footprint may preclude them from otherwise 
viable employment opportunities.63  This discrimination by ommission further marginalizes 
those who are economically vulnerable through barriers in technology. 
Some look to the technology industry as an indicator of where overreliance on 
algorithms in hiring practices have gone wrong, where as little as two percent of Google’s vast 
work force, for example, was African American.64As Frank Pasquale states, “algorithms just dry 
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up discrimination further up.”65  The problem with algorithms in aiding the human 
decisionmaking process in employment practices is has more to do with the assumption that 
algorithms are unbiased and neutral without understanding the mechanisms that go into 
developing the algorithm or how the algorithm arrives at a particular result.  The “black box” of 
algorithms - whether it be an complexity of computer coding or the trade secret protections of 
data brokers or companies who develop algorithms making the understanding of algorithms 
opaque - hampers a reasonable approach to human resources to justify hiring and firing 
decisions.66   
Even more dangerously, this black box of secrecy can allow discrimination based on 
race or gender to proliferate insidiously and go undetected until disparate impacts on minority 
populations are revealed.  Perhaps the European Union’s solution in the Right to Know and 
challenge algorithmic decisions can pave a way to better accountability and oversight which 
could reveal the dangers of relying on secret formulas that no one can explain. 
B. Where Does the Bias Enter the Algorithm? 
 Bias enters the algorithm mostly at the early stages of creation.  Discrimination can 
result in primarily two ways: First, algorithms are learning tools, which mimic human behavior.  
For example, if a particular company has hired more men than women or has retained mostly 
white employees, an algorithm may associate the majority gender or race as qualities of 
successful employees, and therefore select applicants who are male, or white, or have white-
sounding names.67  In this way, because of institutionalized discrimination already prevalent by 
human machinations, algorithms mimic these patterns to perpetuate prior prejudices.  The 
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following is an example of what Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst describe as the “garbage 
in, garbage out” problem of data science: 
If LinkedIn determines which candidates to recommend based on the demonstrated 
interest of employers in certain types of candidates, Talent Match will offer 
recommendations that reflect whatever biases employers happen to exhibit. In particular, 
if LinkedIn’s algorithm observes that employers disfavor certain candidates who are 
members of a protected class, Talent Match may decrease the rate at which it 
recommends these candidates to employers. The recommendation engine would learn to 
cater to the prejudicial preferences of employers.68 
 The second way that algorithms intuit bias is through the creation of the code itself.  If 
the code looks for certain terms that are characteristic to one particular protected class of 
minorities, then the resulting candidate pool shrinks to those who have those desired traits.  
Similar to proxy credit scoring, if coded terms are simply a proxy for race, for example, like zip 
codes, the effect would be a homogenous set of individuals.  Further, if there are flaws in the 
underlying data being collected which rely on historical prejudices or systemic inequalities, 
such trends will be baked into the underlying algorithm and further exacerbate the 
discrimination, however unintentional. 
 Both of these problems extend in some way from faulty data.  For example, if a 
company or agency uses an algorithm based on grades or assessments given by human 
generated performance evaluations, whatever bias from previous human input would be 
perpetuated and expanded by the algorithm with no corrective oversight.69 Solon Barocas and 
Andrew D. Selbst have deemed both of these algorithmic errors as false or inaccurate target 
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classifications.70  Algorithms work by classifying and labelling traits and qualities in order to 
come to a conclusion about an individual with predictive ability.  Either through mining data 
about a job applicant or decoding language on an applicant’s resume and application, by 
identifying patterns regarding a person with a subset of certain traits and the patterns associated 
with each of those traits, algorithms can then generate an easy conclusion on which employers 
base their hiring and firing decisions.  Yet because these errors are common, innocent, opaque, 
and its impact pervasive over reliance on stereotypical pattern-matching can lead to vastly 
disparate impact for minority populations.  For example, if turnover rates for minority groups 
have a pattern of being high, an employer who engages in algorithmic hiring that codes for 
likelihood of tenure status would be less likely to find minority applicants identified as qualified 
candidates.71 
C. What Laws Might Be Applicable? 
 While protected minority classes like race, gender, sexual orientation, and veteran status 
are covered from employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the legal 
hurdle with combatting discrimination with the use of algorithms in hiring and firing practices is 
the lack of clear evidence of knowledge or intent to discriminate.  The only avenue that lawyers 
can seek is through disparate impact litigation - by looking at the negative results that 
algorithmic hiring produces even without malicious intent.  A successful attempt at this strategy 
was Griggs v. Duke Power Company,72 where the Supreme Court ruled that it was a violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for the power company to use intelligence test scores and the 
receipt of a high school diploma as the sole basis of hiring decisions where the impact is its 
exclusion of racial minorities.  However, the reach of this case’s success is limited in that 
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disparate impact litigation is only applicable if the plaintiffs can prove that the hiring 
requirements used are irrelevant to the task required of by the job.  If, however, a company or 
government agency can argue that such requirements are a “business necessity” and directly 
related to job performance, then, regardless of the discriminatory impact or disparate results, the 
hiring practice will be deemed valid as long as no malicious discriminatory intent was 
involved.73 This business necessity argument holds even further weight if the predictive power 
of algorithms are accurate in assuring high quality candidates, even though it turns a blind eye 
to other candidates from minority groups.74 
 Furthermore, after the Gideon v. Duke Power Company decision, employers have begun 
to substitute illegal intelligence tests with proxy personality tests which sometimes mirror the 
aspects of intelligence tests that would unfairly stigmatize applicants.  For example, a class 
action lawsuit was filed against many large corporations for their use of personality tests in job 
applications that inherently test for medical and mental disabilities with questions like “Do you 
find yourself angry often?”75  Algorithms are then used to detect a pattern or likelihood of 
individuals with these traits and their tendencies for mental or emotional instability, and 
therefore discourage employers from choosing these candidates.  Such tests, if truly equated to 
medical questions, would run afoul of the sanctions in place through the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) which prohibits employers from discriminating against hiring an 
otherwise qualified applicant due to a disability.76  Yet employers and private creators of such 
personality tests have found ways to circumvent these regulations by asking more nuanced 
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questions that do not reflect medical information on its face, and therefore disqualify disabled 
applicants from employment.77 
 The secrecy and complexity behind algorithmic decisions is therefore dangerous not 
only because there is little to no way of telling whether malicious discriminatory intent was 
purposely coded into the algorithm, but also because most likely algorithms will intuit patterns 
on their own and inadvertently produce the disparate impact on minority groups.  A blind 
reliance on algorithms does little to challenge the status quo and the preexisting societal biases 
they perpetuate. 
D. Possible Solutions in This Field 
 Of course transparency and regulation of algorithmic use in the public and private 
sectors would be ideal.  However, this approach is riddled with faults as discussed in the above 
sections regarding barriers to regulation and the current state of the law.  If the European Union 
is successful with their reform-minded Right to Explanation in the new iteration of the GDPR in 
2018, then perhaps there is the possibility of algorithms being made with clarity and employers 
are fully informed of how the algorithms work (computer science data and all) so as to 
understand the results.  It would be a great step forward, yet there are still barriers to such 
transparency implemented in the United States even if the GDPR was successful.  Again, the 
state of the law mentioned in above sections like trade secret laws still prevent the much needed 
regulatory framework around algorithms. 
Some have suggested that the disparate impact faced by minorities in the workplace, 
since it is systemic and cannot be dealt with through individual lawsuits, should instead be 
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treated much like affirmative action or disability law.78  In this way, the burden is on the 
employer to look at hiring schemes including the use of algorithms through the lens of equality 
and impact rather than through efficiency or pure profit driven goals.  This way, there would not 
be a prohibition on the use of algorithms or data mining to inform employers, but a more open 
approach in understanding the effect that employing such algorithms might have and finding 
ways to counteract the systemic biases it perpetuates.   
And similar to the ADA, changes to the workplace to accommodate candidates with 
traits that algorithms have deemed to be a predictor of a bad employee could change the 
predicted outcome of the applicant. For example, if algorithms have detected that women with 
families have lower retention rates and would therefore be undesirable for the employer who 
wants to minimize tenure, the employer could change the workplace by providing flexible 
schedules for those with families or make other accommodations to make the workplace more 
family-friendly.79  Another example would be to make the workplace more friendly and 
accepting of other cultures and welcome underrepresented minority groups.  Changes to what 
employers can control in their workplace can also disrupt the trajectory of discrimination 
against protected classes reflected in society, and break the prophetic models of algorithms.  
By recognizing the shortcomings of algorithms and avoiding blind reliance on their 
seeming infallibility, employer can not only find a whole new subset of employees previously 
weeded out by algorithms, but also work to change the lack of representation of minorities, 
women, the disabled community, and other vulnerable classes in the work field.  Further, by 
recognizing these disparities, these algorithms could be retooled to account for the 
discrimination and bias in society, and data-mining software can look for other societal factors 
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that would account for lower employment rates, lower graduation rates, and higher incarceration 
rates for an applicant.  
While we cannot hope for absolute transparency of how these algorithms work, simply 
being cognizant of algorithms’ potential to exclude, discriminate, and skew data can perhaps 
persuade social-minded employers to add corrective measures into their hiring and firing 
practices.   
Conclusion 
Has the use of algorithms gone too far? “A single human showing explicit bias can only 
ever affect a finite number of people. An algorithm, on the other hand, has the potential to 
impact the lives of exponentially more.”80 The popularity of algorithms is driven by the need for 
efficiency and to provide an “unbiased” solutions. The issue is not whether it is better to use 
algorithms instead of humans - clearly there is a lower chance of blatantly bias decisions being 
made by the algorithm. Rather the issue is the dangers of assuming infallibility of algorithms - 
the belief that the algorithm can do no wrong. The over reliance on the “unbiased” efficient 
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